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Job Loss: Consequences and 
Labor Market Policy
Jonas Cederlöf 
In March 2020, the U.S. economy saw an unprecedented 
increase in the number of layoffs and discharges due to the 
outbreak of the COVID-19 virus. Over 11 million American 
workers were displaced—a 670 percent increase compared 
to the same month the previous year. The unemployment rate 
rose quickly and was recorded at an all-time high of 14.7 
percent in April 2020. Not only is displacement a traumatic 
event in and by itself, but it also has been shown to lead to 
significant and even permanent losses for workers in terms 
of future earnings, employment, wages, health, and mortality 
(Sullivan and von Wachter 2009). Furthermore, the large and 
potentially permanent negative consequences from job loss 
obviously puts a massive strain on public expenditures in 
terms of providing unemployment benefits, health care, and 
social assistance.
This thesis consists of four self-contained essays devoted 
to the topic of job loss, its consequences for individual 
workers, and how related labor market polices could be used 
and affect subsequent labor market outcomes for workers. 
The first essay studies the short- and long-run consequences 
of job loss for individual workers and explores why and 
under what circumstances the cost of displacement are most 
persistent. In the second essay, which is joint work with Peter 
Fredriksson, Arash Nekoei, and David Seim, we examine 
the effects of advance notice of job loss and how such notice 
affects the labor market prospects for workers. The third 
essay, coauthored with Martin Söderström and Johan  
Vikström, empirically analyzes the importance of casework-
ers at the Public Employment Service. Here we examine 
not only caseworker value-added but also which features of 
a caseworker are important for job seeker outcomes and to 
what extent job seeker–caseworker matching matter. The 
fourth and final essay of this thesis examines a 30-week 
unemployment benefit extension and studies how the exten-
sion affects both benefit and unemployment duration, as well 
as the hazard to employment.
Essay 1
Saved by Seniority—Effects of Displacement 
for Workers at the Margin of Layoff
A large literature documents that displaced workers suffer 
significant and even permanent losses in terms of their future 
earnings, employment, and wages. Since the seminal study 
by Jacobson, Lalonde, and Sullivan (1993), the literature has 
relied on comparisons of displaced vis-à-vis nondisplaced 
high-tenured workers, using mass layoffs or plant closures 
as an exogenous source of variation. However, most job loss 
occurs because of more marginal adjustments to employ-
ment. Strikingly, between 2003 and 2012, only about 8 per-
cent of all involuntary separations in the United States were 
due to mass layoffs, many of which also involved lower- 
tenured workers.1 Meanwhile, little is known to what extent 
the results from mass layoffs generalize to less drastic and 
more regular adjustments to employment, or if extraordinary 
events render extraordinary consequences for workers?
The first essay of this thesis studies the short- and long-
run consequences of job loss for workers and explores why 
and under what circumstances the cost of displacement is 
most persistent. This is done using a novel source of iden-
tification, exploiting the use of a last-in-first-out (LIFO) 
rule used in layoffs in Sweden. The LIFO rule mandates 
that workers should be laid off in inverse order of seniority, 
whereby more recent hires ought to be let go before workers 
with higher tenure. Using detailed matched employer- 
employee data, containing information on job start and end 
dates, I rank workers according to their relative seniority 
(tenure) within an establishment which, by the LIFO rule, 
renders variation in the probability of displacement. Com-
bining these data with a unique individual register dataset 
containing all layoff notifications involving at least five 
workers during 2005–2015, I identify occupation-specific 
cutoffs in downsizing establishments where the probability 
of displacement jumps discontinuously. This lends itself 
to a (fuzzy) regression discontinuity (RD) design, where 
the discontinuities enable me to go beyond standard mass 
layoff estimates and study earnings, employment, and wage 
losses for a broader and more representative population of 
workers who are laid off because of less drastic and more 
regular adjustments to employment. Exploiting the large 
heterogeneity across layoffs, I also pool different thresholds 
and separately estimate earnings losses and its persistence by 
worker characteristics and the size of layoff to investigate the 
key drivers of permanent earnings losses.
The main finding is that both the composition of workers 
and the size of the layoff have important consequences for 
how workers are affected by job loss, particularly in the long 
run. My estimates indicate that displaced workers on average 
suffer initial earnings losses of about 38 percent compared to 
their nondisplaced coworkers. While not being fully compa-
rable, the size of these initial losses is close to what has been 
observed for displaced workers in the United States who are 
laid off during recessions (Davis and von Wachter 2011). As 
time progresses, however, the earnings gap between dis-
placed and nondisplaced workers shrinks and is fully closed 
seven years after displacement. Crucially, this is not driven 
by the nondisplaced workers getting laid off at a later point 
in time. I also decompose cumulative earnings losses into 
different margins of adjustment and show that these losses 
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are primarily driven by lower wages and less employment, 
whereas the hours responses are of lesser importance.
My finding that earnings losses are transitory rather 
than persistent stands in contrast to the previous literature, 
which finds long-run earnings losses ranging between 10 
and 20 percent of previous earnings. I make use of the large 
heterogeneity across layoffs to understand the main drivers 
of long-run earnings losses. I begin by estimating earnings 
losses of displaced workers using mass layoffs following 
the standard event study approach. I find large and highly 
persistent effects of displacement, thus ruling out that the 
transitory pattern observed in the RD analysis is context 
or time specific. I then proceed by producing separate RD 
estimates for each layoff. I correlate the short- and the long-
run losses with characteristics of the workers, occupation, 
and establishment involved in the layoff, as well as economic 
conditions at the time of notification. While I find that older 
workers are more negatively affected by job loss, the key 
driver of persistent earnings losses turns out to be the relative 
size of the layoff. In fact, significant persistence can only be 
found among establishments executing mass layoffs, that is, 
those that displace more than 30 percent of their workforces. 
This pattern remains even when controlling for worker char-
acteristics and economic conditions. Going further, I exploit 
the fact that there is variation in the size of the layoff relative 
to the local labor market, holding constant the layoff size in 
relation to the establishment. These estimates indicate that 
the key determinant of persistent earnings losses is the size 
of the layoff in relation to the local labor market, suggesting 
that negative spillovers and labor congestion play an import-
ant role for workers’ future labor market outcomes.
To my knowledge, this is the first study to exploit senior-
ity rules as an exogenous source of variation to involun-
tary job loss. Relative to the previous literature estimating 
earnings losses upon displacement, the findings shed new 
light on the question of how workers are affected by job loss 
and whether displacement creates lasting scars or merely 
temporary blemishes. Whereas previous literature suggests 
the former, my results indicate that while this may be true for 
high-tenured workers displaced under a mass layoff, earnings 
losses are temporary and transitory when considering more 
regular and less drastic adjustments to employment. These 
results may have important implications for both targeting 
and shaping of public policy.
The findings in this paper also speak to the theoretical lit-
erature explaining the observed earnings losses of displaced 
workers in models featuring search frictions, unemploy-
ment fluctuations, and job ladders (see, e.g., Ljungqvist and 
Sargent [1998]; Davis and von Wachter [2011]; Krolikowski 
[2017]; Kuhn and Jung [2019]). Many of the standard mod-
els of the labor market have trouble generating the magnitude 
and persistence of empirically observed losses or disagree 
on its sources (Davis and von Wachter 2011; Carrington and 
Fallick 2017). My results suggest that the way for a mecha-
nism generating long-run persistence at the individual level 
has been overemphasized in the theoretical literature.
Essay 2
How Does Advance Layoff Notice Affect the 
Labor Market Prospects for Workers?
(with Peter Fredriksson, Arash Nekoei, and David Seim)
Layoff rules are sometimes criticized for hampering 
the speed of adjustment after adverse shocks and creating 
inefficiencies in the allocation of resources. However, layoff 
rules also provide insurance for workers in part by mandat-
ing that firms share information on future reductions in labor 
demand, and they may force firms to share the costs associ-
ated with layoff.
The second essay in this thesis examines how advance 
layoff notice affects the labor market prospects for workers. 
More precisely, we utilize quasi-random variation in the 
length of notice periods to estimate the effects of advance 
notice on exposure to nonemployment, job mobility, sub-
sequent wages, and earnings. The quasi-random variation 
comes from collective bargaining agreements, which stip-
ulate that individuals above a certain age get longer notice 
periods. We estimate the causal effects of longer advance 
notice in a regression discontinuity design.
Employment protection legislation in most countries 
features advance layoff notice. The length of the notice 
period typically increases with tenure and tends to be longer 
for white-collar workers than for blue-collar workers. Notice 
periods are also longer in Northern and Continental Europe 
than in Anglo-Saxon countries (Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development [OECD] 2013). In the United 
States, labor laws do not feature notice periods in the case of 
individual dismissals, but in the case of plant closures and 
mass layoffs, legislation sometimes mandates that workers 
are given two months of notice.
Contracts may also provide employment protection and 
advance notice. In the United States, for example, collec-
tive bargaining agreements often include notice periods and 
severance pay. Such agreements provide workers with extra 
protection relative to the law. In the Swedish context, the law 
provides a set of default rules, and the provisos in the collec-
tive agreements provide workers with additional protection.
Previous empirical analyses of employment protection 
originate from the seminal work of Lazear (1990). Using a 
panel of OECD countries, Lazear (1990) finds that sever-
ance pay increases unemployment. In a different panel of 
countries, Heckman and Pagés (2004) document a negative 
association between job security provisions and employment 
rates. Another strand of the literature exploits policy reforms 
to obtain quasi-experimental effects of employment pro-
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tection on various outcomes. Kugler and Pica (2008) show 
that mandated severance pay reduces employment in Italy, 
while Autor, Kerr, and Kugler (2007) find similar effects on 
employment from increased dismissal costs.
We contribute to this literature along two margins. First, 
the employment outcomes in previous studies originate from 
both hiring and separations margins. By focusing on separa-
tions, we specifically investigate the role of advance notice 
for a laid-off worker, thereby uncovering the insurance role 
of such employer protection legislation. Second, our set-
ting provides the ideal testing ground from an identification 
perspective. We exploit exogenous variation in the length 
of advance notice within establishments and displacement 
events, across individuals. This permits a compelling analy-
sis of the causal effects of advance notice.
We also contribute to an older literature, which investi-
gates the role of advance notice for laid-off workers using 
the Displaced Worker Survey (see Ruhm [1992, 1994] and 
the survey in Addison and Blackburn [1994]). That literature 
exploits cross-sectional variation in advance notice periods 
instigated by the Worker Assistance and Retraining Notifica-
tion Act and finds that joblessness falls upon notification of 
job loss. Our paper breaks new ground by providing qua-
si-experimental variation applied to administrative data on 
long-term outcomes.
Advance notice policies are clearly related to severance 
pay and unemployment insurance policies. Pissarides (2001) 
analyzes a model where firms can offer severance pay and 
advance notice as part of an optimal contract, but unemploy-
ment insurance (UI) is exogenously set by the government. 
His analysis implies that optimal contracts are more likely to 
involve severance pay or advance notice when UI replace-
ment rates are low. In his model, advance notice plays a 
role over and above severance payments if and only if the 
insurance properties are sufficiently superior.2
Our empirical work relates to the model in Pissarides 
(2001) in the sense that we think of (voluntary) severance 
pay as an outcome of other policy parameters, in our case 
mandatory advance notice. We examine whether firms are 
willing to make—and whether workers accept—an up-front 
severance payment in order to avoid the notice period. To 
our knowledge, this is the first paper that provides such an 
analysis.
The major results of the paper are the following. Longer 
notice periods cause prolonged periods of adjustment. For 
workers who are eligible for a longer notification period (the 
treatment group), the probability of remaining in the displac-
ing firm increases during the first two years after notification, 
and the probability of moving to another firm falls during the 
same time period. As a result of an extension of the notice 
period, workers are less exposed to unemployment and 
nonemployment and spend less time outside the labor force. 
After two years, all employment responses have subsided 
and there are no differential effects on employment outcomes 
for the treatment and control groups. We also show that the 
treatment group experiences smaller wage losses when find-
ing a new job than the control group: wages in new jobs are 
3 percent higher for the treatment group than for the control 
group. Moreover, firms make severance payments to workers 
in order to avoid the notice period: the extra payment accru-
ing to the treatment group amounts to almost 60 percent of 
the monthly wage. Finally, we show that workers who are 
eligible for higher UI get lower severance payments. This is 
consistent with the view that they are more willing to accept 
lower severance pay since they have a better outside option 
should they leave the firm for unemployment.
The extra severance payment is part of the overall effect 
on earnings for treated workers. When we decompose the 
earnings effect accruing to workers during the first two years 
after notification, we find that around half of the earnings 
effects has to do with less exposure to nonemployment and a 
third is due to the increase in severance pay. The wage effect 
amounts to a fifth of the overall earnings effect. Over time, 
the wage effect becomes less important as individuals with 
short notification periods—who initially find a lower-quality 
job—move on to better-paying jobs at a greater rate than 
individuals with long notification periods.
Essay 3
What Makes a Good Caseworker?
(with Martin Söderström and Johan Vikström)
Countries around the world use job search assistance, 
monitoring schemes, and labor market programs to try to 
bring unemployed workers back to work. By now, there is 
extensive evidence on these policies (see, e.g., Card, Kluve, 
and Weber [2010, 2017]). However, much less is known 
about the caseworkers who provide the job search assistance, 
carry out the monitoring, and assign job seekers to programs 
(see the literature review below and McCall, Smith, and 
Wunsch [2016]). This is unfortunate, since a comprehensive 
picture of labor market policies requires that we understand 
the role of the human resources used to provide the services. 
It is, for example, important to know who becomes a case-
worker, why some caseworkers perform better than others, 
and for whom caseworkers matter the most. While these are 
important questions, the evidence is scarce for two important 
reasons. First, in most cases, there is nonrandom sorting of 
job seekers to caseworkers, often because the most produc-
tive caseworkers are assigned the most disadvantaged job 
seekers. Second, high-quality data on caseworkers is often 
lacking. Usually, data do not link caseworkers to job seekers, 
and in the rare cases when such information is available, 
typically little is known about the caseworkers.
In the third essay of this thesis, we address both of these 
issues. First, we break the caseworker–job seeker sorting by 
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exploiting that many local employment offices in Sweden 
use date-of-birth-rules to allocate job seekers to caseworkers, 
creating as-if random allocation. Second, we have access to 
uniquely fine-grained information on caseworkers, such as 
labor market experiences and cognitive ability, and we can 
link job seekers to caseworkers. The quasi-random allocation 
and the fine-grained data allow us to provide new and cred-
ible evidence on the importance of caseworkers and what 
makes a good caseworker.
In Sweden, employment services are provided by case-
workers at local public employment offices. These offices 
have extensive discretion to design the rules for allocating 
job seekers to caseworkers. It turns out that many offices use 
job seekers’ date of birth (day in the month) to allocate them 
to caseworkers. We exploit that the day in the month you are 
born (1st to 31st) is uncorrelated with individual characteris-
tics. Thus, if job seekers are allocated to caseworkers using a 
date-of-birth rule, this creates as-if random allocation, since 
all caseworkers within a local office will have job seekers 
with similar observed and unobserved characteristics.
Our analysis shows that even within the offices that use 
a date-of-birth allocation rule, some job seekers are not 
allocated using the rule. Some offices make exemptions 
for special groups, such as youths, disabled workers, or 
immigrants, and allocate these groups to caseworkers who 
are believed to be able to provide the best support to them. 
Since these exemptions may introduce sorting, we use an 
IV-framework exploiting that we can identify the caseworker 
each job seeker would have had if they had been allocated 
using the date-of-birth rule. This rule-predicted caseworker is 
then used as an instrument for the caseworker assigned to the 
job seeker. This identification strategy adds to the existing 
literature on caseworkers, which mainly includes studies 
based on conditional independence assumptions, assuming 
that the allocation of job seekers to caseworkers is random 
conditional on observed job seeker characteristics (see, e.g., 
Lechner and Smith [2007]; Behncke, Frölich, and Lechner 
[2010a,b]; Arni, van den Berg, and Lalive [2017]; Arni and 
Schiprowski [2019]). One recent exception, however, is 
Schiprowski (2020), who exploits unplanned absences to 
study the effects of a meeting with a caseworker and to study 
productivity differences across caseworkers. Our paper uses 
detailed data on caseworkers and the date-of-birth allocation 
to provide more comprehensive evidence on caseworker 
performance.
Our unique administrative data on caseworkers include 
rich measures of labor market history, such as information on 
previous occupations and personal experience with unem-
ployment. For most male caseworkers, we also have infor-
mation on cognitive and noncognitive ability from enlistment 
tests. Staff records provide information on experience (tenure 
at the public employment service) and wages for each case-
worker. To this, we add information on demographics such as 
gender, level and type of education, and country of origin.
Using the fine-grained caseworker data, we initially 
study who becomes a caseworker. One conclusion is that 
caseworkers in Sweden are a heterogeneous group that 
includes former blue-collar workers; individuals with 
university degrees in social work, business economics, and 
human relations; and both natives and nonnatives. Interest-
ingly, caseworkers have, on average, lower cognitive skills, 
substantially more experience of unemployment, but similar 
noncognitive skills as other public sector employees with 
similar types of occupations.
We then study caseworker performance in three different 
parts. In the first part, we analyze how different observed 
caseworker characteristics are related to caseworker perfor-
mance as measured by the reemployment rate among their 
job seekers. Even though we are able to study a hetero-
geneous group of caseworkers, few observed caseworker 
characteristics predict caseworker performance. The most 
important characteristic is the gender of the caseworker: job 
seekers with female caseworkers have 3.1 percent shorter 
unemployment durations than those with a male caseworker. 
There is also some evidence that caseworkers with higher 
wages perform better, but this may, of course, reflect both 
that high-performing caseworkers are rewarded with higher 
wages and that higher wages motivate caseworkers to per-
form better. However, many other caseworker characteristics, 
such as type of education, level of education, experience 
from previous occupations, and personal experience with 
unemployment are not related to caseworker performance. 
These results are consistent with results from the teacher 
literature, which finds little evidence of a relationship 
between teacher quality and observed teacher characteristics 
(Rockoff 2004; Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain 2005; Rockoff 
et al. 2011). Moreover, caseworkers with higher cognitive 
ability do not perform better than low-ability caseworkers. 
There is, however, some suggestive evidence indicating that 
caseworkers with higher noncognitive ability may have a 
positive impact on job seekers’ job-finding rates early on in 
the unemployment spell.
Based on the actions taken by the caseworkers, we also 
examine caseworker traits. Inspired by Arni, van den Berg, 
and Lalive (2017), we define “supportive” caseworkers as 
those who more often use supportive actions, such as sending 
their job seekers to labor market training, whereas “restric-
tive” caseworkers are those who more often use restrictive 
policies such as workfare. Furthermore, we define “active” 
caseworkers as those who more frequently meet with their 
job seekers. Our results show that active caseworkers per-
form better than other caseworkers. This adds to the rather 
few existing studies: Arni, van den Berg, and Lalive (2017) 
find that caseworkers who emphasize support have better 
outcomes, while Behncke, Frölich, and Lechner (2010b) 
show that tougher caseworkers are more successful than 
supportive ones.
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The second part of the paper examines caseworker–job 
seeker matching and focuses on caseworker–job seeker sim-
ilarity, since it has been argued that sharing the same social 
background can enhance communication and trust. This is 
also what we find. Being assigned a caseworker with the 
same gender leads to a higher job-finding rate, but it is not 
the case that immigrant caseworkers provide better support 
to immigrants. Using our fine-grained data, we are also the 
first to show that matching job seekers to caseworkers with 
similar labor market experiences and/or similar educational 
background leads to substantially shorter unemployment 
durations. Besides improved communication and trust, this 
may also reflect that experience from working in the same 
sector as the job seeker enables caseworkers to understand 
the individual-specific labor market opportunities, and that 
caseworkers can use their social networks to help job seekers 
with similar labor market experiences.
The third and final part of the paper examines the over-
all importance of caseworkers by estimating caseworker 
fixed effects. This takes into account differences due to both 
observed and unobserved caseworker characteristics. The 
overall conclusion is that there are economically important 
differences between caseworkers. A one standard deviation 
increase in the distribution of caseworker fixed effects not 
only increases the job-finding rate among the job seekers 
by around 0.1 standard deviation but also renders about 5 
percent higher earnings after three years. This confirms that 
caseworkers indeed can affect how quickly job seekers get 
back to work, a result consistent with Schiprowski (2020). It 
is also in line with the results from other economic contexts; 
a large literature has documented substantial differences 
in teacher quality (Rockoff 2004; Rivkin, Hanushek, and 
Kain 2005; Rothstein 2010; Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff 
2014a,b), and several studies have shown that managers 
matter for firm policies and firm performance (Bertrand and 
Schoar 2002; Bloom et al. 2014; Lazear, Shaw, and Stanton 
2015).
Essay 4
Extended Unemployment Benefits and the  
Hazard to Employment
How does the generosity of UI affect job search behav-
ior? While providing a safety net for unexpected job loss, 
the provision of UI creates disincentives for job search by 
lowering the alternative cost to working. The question of 
how benefit levels and their overall generosity affects time 
in, and the hazard out of, unemployment has a long tradi-
tion in labor economics and has been subject to extensive 
research. The “spike” in the hazard rate out of unemploy-
ment coinciding with UI exhaustion is a widely established 
empirical result since the seminal work by Katz and Meyer 
(1990a,b). This result generally has been attributed to 
shirking behavior among job seekers, holding off finding 
a new job until approaching benefit exhaustion. However, 
later work by Card, Chetty, and Weber (2007) challenges this 
view by attributing the lion’s share of such spikes to flight 
out of the labor force. They argue that “spikes are gener-
ally smaller when the spell length is measured by the time 
to next job than when it is defined by the time spent on the 
unemployment system” (p. 1). Hence, “ . . . the size of the 
spike in re-employment rates at exhaustion in the current 
U.S. labor market (and many other labor markets) remains 
an open question. Further work on estimating these hazards 
using administrative measures of time to next job would be 
particularly valuable” (p. 16). Indeed, if benefit exhaustion 
renders job seekers to leave the labor force, the expected cost 
of extending UI benefits could be exaggerated if transition to 
work is higher from unemployment than nonemployment.
This paper contributes to the debate about the timing 
of reemployment and UI exhaustion while adding to the 
large literature on the effects of UI on job search behavior. 
In particular, I examine the effect on unemployment dura-
tion, and exit to employment, of an exogenous 30-week 
UI benefit extension in Sweden. For identification, I take 
advantage of a feature in the Swedish UI system that entitles 
individuals with a child below the age of 18 to 90 weeks of 
unemployment benefits instead of the statutory 60 weeks. As 
assignment to the extended UI benefit is determined by the 
age of a job seekers’ youngest child at the time of regular UI 
exhaustion (60 weeks), I exploit the quasi-experimental vari-
ation generated around the age threshold using a regression 
discontinuity design. This allows me to estimate the causal 
effect of increasing potential duration of UI on actual benefit 
duration, unemployment duration, and hazard to employ-
ment. Further, I allow the effects to vary with duration on 
UI and in unemployment to test whether job seekers time 
employment to benefit extension.
The main findings are threefold. First, while the increase 
in potential duration on UI increases actual duration on UI by 
about 2.7 weeks on average, I find no evidence of it pro-
longing duration in registered unemployment or negatively 
affecting the hazard to employment. This suggests that the 
30-week benefit extension did not prolong average unem-
ployment duration, as job seekers were unemployed just as 
long on average but with a somewhat higher replacement 
rate. The absence of negative effects on unemployment dura-
tion and future employment is believed to be driven by job 
seekers’ access to fairly generous post-UI programs, which 
weakens the disincentive effects of the benefit extension. 
Second, being eligible to 30 additional weeks of UI does 
not appear to have affected job search behavior prior to the 
actual extension period. That is, I find no evidence of job 
seekers lowering their search efforts due to the anticipation 
of extended benefits. Third, I find distinct spikes in the exit 
from UI at benefit exhaustion, but no such spikes are present 
12 2020 Dissertation Summaries
in the hazard to employment. This therefore speaks in favor 
of the interpretation made in Card, Chetty, and Weber (2007).
Notes
1.  Calculations are based on data from the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics by combining data from the Mass Layoff Statistics program 
(which ended in March 2013) with the Job Openings and Labor 
Turnover Survey. That survey reports the total number of layoffs 
and discharges, which is made up of all involuntary separa-
tions initiated by the employer. Both these data sources can be 
accessed at http://www.bls.gov.
2.  A severance payment is a pure transfer from the worker to the  
firm and thus does not affect the private surplus of the match. By 
contrast, advance notice may have a negative effect on the private 
surplus if the match is kept alive after it has become unpro-
ductive. These costs have two components: first, there may be 
variable costs associated with keeping an unproductive job alive; 
second, for the worker-firm pair, unemployment income is a pure 
subsidy that is forgone by keeping the match alive. In the frame-
work of Pissarides (2001), the insurance value of advance notice 
must thus outweigh these losses relative to the severance pay.
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